I. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the United States attorney, federal courts are directed by 18 U.S.C. § § 6002-03' to give use immunity to a witness, which compels the witness to testify on the condition that his testimony may not be used against him in any criminal case. Until recently, when § 6002. Immunity generally Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States, (2) an agency of the United States, or 3 either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings (a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment-(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and-(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination. a defendant in a federal criminal trial requested that his witnesses be granted use immunity pursuant to this statute, the district court judge would deny the motion as beyond his power if the prosecutor did not acquiesce. 2 Because of the inability of defendants to have their witnesses immunized, many witnesses refuse to testify, thereby denying to the court and defendant potentially exculpatory evidence. In response to defense attempts to introduce valuable evidence, two recent cases 3 have set forth different views of the right of a defendant who seeks to have his own witnesses immunized.
In Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith ,4 the Third Circuit held that if prosecutorial misconduct were found on remand, a judgment of acquittal would be entered for the defendant unless the government consented to grant statutory use immunity to a defense witness. If immunity were granted, a new trial would be ordered. 5 Alternatively, the judge found that under certain circumstances, the court itself should grant judicial immunity to the witness. 6 The Second Circuit, in United States v. Turkish, 7 reached the opposite conclusion, stating that trial judges should "summarily reject claims for defense witness immunity whenever the witness . . . is an actual or potential target of prosecution." 8 The court left open the possibility, however, that under certain strictly prescribed circumstances, the court could intervene on behalf of the defendant. 9 [Vol. 72 Absent prosecutorial misconduct, no court has found that a defendant has a general due process right to have his witnesses immunized, though some courts have indicated that the right may exist in certain instances even in the absence of misconduct.12
Given a fifth amendment violation, judges disagree as to whether they are empowered to remedy the violation. Because the statute places the immunity power within the prosecutor's discretion, most courts maintain that their intervention on behalf of the defendant would violate the constitutional principle of separation of judicial and executive powers.13 Invocation of this principle unduly simplifies a very difficult constitutional and policy struggle and is of dubious validity in light of the courts' supervisory' 4 and inherent powers. 15 It should therefore be material, exculpatory, and not cumulative, it will be time enough to decide whether in those circumstances a court has any proper role with respect to defense witness immunity." Id at 778-79. Concurring in the Turkish ruling but dissenting in the Turkish dicta, Judge Lumbard was critical of the majority's view that "under certain circumstances the district court would be under the duty of inquiring into whether or not the prosecution should grant use immunity to a prospective defense witness." Id at 779. (1980) , where the author suggests a "'preferred status'" doctrine to determine whether immunity should be granted for both defense and prosecution witnesses. Id at 705. This doctrine presumes that immunity grants violate the fifth amendment right to silence. Id at 705-06. Therefore, for immunity to be granted, whoever asks for immunity must present "persuasive and cogent arguments" proving "that compulsion orders are essential to the public interest or necessary to prevent a gross injustice to the defendant." Id For a discussion of the tension between the defendant's and witness ' "It is certainly arguable that without the right to have immunity granted a defendant lacks 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor' as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment"; Westen, Compulso. , Process, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71 (1974) . This article contains a comprehensive history of the compulsory process clause and an argument that " [u] nless the defendant can be distinguished from the prosecution in significant ways, the defendant has a presumptive right to obtain immunity for his witnesses on an equal basis with the prosecution. The author characterizes the issue in defense witness immunity as being "the defendant's constitutional right to obtain favorable evidence" rather than "the defendant's right to immunize witnesses." Id at 1213. The author cites a series of Supreme Court decision which suggest that "once a defendant shows a significant need for testimony and demonstrates that the testimony is reliable and material, the defendant's interest outweighs a broad range of general state interests in exclusion." Id 18 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. In Washhigton v. Texas, 20 the Court held that the compulsory process clause prohibits a state from barring a defendant's accomplice as a defense witness because " [t] he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use." '21 In rejecting the State's claims that co-defendants were likely to perjure themselves and "that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to the court's interest in preventing perjury," 22 the Court found that "[j]ust as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense." '23 Thus, if a defendant is "arbitrarily denied" the right to put a witness on the stand "whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense," 24 the defendant's compulsory process rights would require a reversal of the decision.
While the Washington case did not involve an attempt to immunize defense witnesses, commentators suggest that "[t]he constitutional right of the accused to obtain immunity for his witnesses falls squarely within the language and purpose of the compulsory process clause." ' 25 Courts have rejected this argument. In a decision representative of judicial denial of compulsory process claims, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Turkish ,26 concluded that the compulsory process clause does not permit courts to grant immunity without petition by the prosecution, and dismissed the compulsory process claims summarily: "[I]t is difficult to see how the Sixth Amendment of its own force places upon either the prosecutor or the court any affirmative obligation to secure testimony from a defense witness by replacing the protection of the self-incrimination privilege with a grant of use immunity.
' 2 7
The Turkish decision seems basically inconsistent with the philosophy inherent in Washington, which established that courts cannot arbitrarily deny a defendant the right to present favorable witnesses. This principle would appear to permit a court to review a prosecutor's deci- that the government produce exculpatory evidence on behalf of the defendant, 3 2 reciprocity of discovery rights between the prosecution and the defense, 33 and the reversal of convictions when courts find prosecutorial misconduct.
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Some courts recognize that due process requires a new trial or acquittal for a defendant whose witness is not immunized when blatant prosecutorial misconduct or an intentional disruption of the fact finding 28 18 U.S.C. § 6003. For the text of the statute, see note 1 supira.
The author in Note, The Sixth Amendment Right, supra note 17, at 1280, suggests another formulation of the arbitrariness standard:
[T]he denial of such immunity when no significant burdens would be imposed on the state must be considered arbitrary. In determining whether an unreasonable burden exists that would justify the refusal to grant immunity in a particular case, the court should consider the extent to which the state has already gathered evidence against the witness as well as the feasibility of isolating the compelled testimony or granting a delay to ensure that the burden is unavoidable. (1980) . In Talor, where the appellant was convicted of assault, there were several accounts of the events which led up to the altercation. Although prosecution witnesses had earlier disclosed one version of the incident, at trial the prosecutor permitted a different account to be introduced. Because of the introduction of the perjured testimony, the court found that the appellant's due process rights were violated. process clearly denied the defendant a fair trial. 35 who initially indicated her willingness to testify for the defendants was advised on several occasions by the assistant United States attorney that if she did testify, she would be subject to prosecution for perjury. The witness was then served with an invalid subpoena to appear at the assistant United States attorney's office. When she appeared pursuant to the subpoena at a meeting with the prosecutor and the three undercover agents her testimony would discredit, she was told that she was likely to be prosecuted for perjury. 3 7 Under these circumstances, the court ordered a retrial, finding that there was prosecutorial misconduct 38 and that there was a violation of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. 39 Because the prosecutorial misconduct violated the defendant's due process rights, the Morson court held that the defendant should be acquitted unless his witness was granted use immunity.
Relying on the decision in Mortson, the Third Circuit in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith 40 remanded the case, and directed the district court to determine whether the prosecution had deliberately distorted the fact finding process. 4 1 In Virgin Islands, several juveniles were on trial for assault. The three defendants sought to introduce the testimony of another youth who admitted taking part in the assault, implicated a fifth youth, and exculpated the three who had been indicted. On taking the stand, the defendants' witness refused to testify, invoking his fifth amendment privilege. The defense unsuccessfully attempted to offer into evidence the witness' prior out-of-court statements to the police and then tried to obtain a grant of immunity for the witness. were willing to grant immunity, had exclusive jurisdiction over the witness, that office, out of courtesy, applied to the United States attorney's office for approval. For unexplained reasons, the United States attorney did not consent. 43 The circuit court remanded the case for evidentiary hearings to determine if the witness should be immunized to prevent a violation of the defendants' due process rights. The court directed that if the district court found a due process violation, the defendants be acquitted unless their witness received use immunity. 44 The prosecutorial misconduct in Monson and suggested in Virgin Islands induced the Third Circuit to protect the defendant against the violation of his due process rights. Absent prosecutorial misconduct, only one court, in United States v. DePalma , 4 5 has ruled that the defendant was denied his due process rights because his witnesses were not granted immunity. Several other courts have left open the possibility that given the proper circumstances, they might find a due process violation. 46 For example, two Second Circuit opinions indicated that defense witness immunity might be required if grants of use immunity to prosecution witnesses resulted in an "unfair advantage. '4 7 Under this standard, the court in DePalma originally required that the defendant's witnesses be granted immunity.
In DePalma, the defendant Horwitz was found guilty of charges of Cir. 1978) . In Gleason, four former bank officers were convicted of making false entries in bank records with the intent to defraud the United States government, bank shareholders and lenders. On appeal, Gleason, the chief executive officer, contended that his due process rights were violated because the Government refused to grant use immunity to his indicted alleged accomplice and co-conspirator. 616 F.2d at 27. The court declined to grant immunity noting that this was not "a case where the Government deliberately manipulated grants of immunity to gain an unfair advantage over any defendant. .. ." Id at 28.
In Lang, the defendant was arrested for possessing counterfeit money. He sought immunity for a witness who allegedly sold counterfeit bills to Lang's girlfriend for Lang's use. Lang claimed that his witness should be granted immunity because the Government had shown no interest in prosecuting him for selling the bills to Lang's girlfriend. The court held that an immunity grant would be improper because the witness would have testified to other transactions with Lang for which he would be immunized. Since there was no prosecutorial misconduct or "discriminatory use of immunity to obtain an unfair advantage over the defendant," the decision not to grant immunity was upheld. 589 F.2d at 96-97.
racketeering, violating the federal securities laws, defrauding purchasers of stock, and obstructing a grand jury investigation. 48 The district court held that the prosecution violated the defendant's due process rights by granting Horwitz's co-conspirators broad transactional immunity while refusing to immunize probative testimony of Horwitz's witnesses. The court granted a retrial directing that unless the prosecution granted use immunity to two defense witnesses, the Government witnesses' testimony would be excluded. 49 On remand from the court of appeals to consider the case in light of Turkish,5° the district court reinstated the guilty verdict because one of the defendant's witnesses was under indictment and both were under continuing investigation. The Turkish decision stated that under those circumstances, immunity could not be granted. 5 ' The district court judge, however, reiterated that Horwitz's original trial had been unfair and that only the peculiar position of Horwitz's witnesses as actual or potential targets of prosecution precluded the granting of immunity.
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The original decision in the DePalma case relied heavily on the dictum in a footnote in Earl v. United States 53 the first case to consider defense witness immunity. 54 Chief Justice Burger, then a circuit judge, found that Earl did not have a due process right to have his witnesses immunized, especially because the prosecution did not request immunity for any of its witnesses. Although the Earl court concluded that "the judicial creation of a procedure comparable to that enacted by
Congress for the benefit of the Government is beyond our power, '5 5 the court's footnote indicated that the defendant might have a due process right to secure immunity for his witnesses, under appropriate circumstances, but held these were not present. The basis of the original decision in DePalma appears to have been that the action of the prosecution, in building its case on a broad grant of immunity without granting immunity to the defendant's witnesses, created an imbalance, which required the court to protect the defendant's due process rights. Without mentioning DePalma, the Second Circuit in Turkish rejected this justification: "[a] criminal prosecution, unlike a civil trial is in no sense a symmetrical proceeding." Judge Bazelon indicated that if faced with the defense witness immunity issue, the court should intervene on behalf of the defendant. Examining the language of the immunity statute, Judge Bazelon found that the due process concern of reliable jury verdicts and " 'the general principle that a prosecutor is not free to decline to make evidence available to the defendant' "60 might compel defense witness immunity. The Leonard court, however, was not faced with the issue, since it was not before the LJ. 879 (1979-80) , where the author suggests that due process violations should not be predicated on findings of prosecutorial misconduct, id at 910, and that an evidentiary hearing be held before immunity is granted. Id at 909. If the defendant's witnesses were not immunized based upon the evidentiary hearing, however, then the author argues that a showing of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor should trigger a due process claim. Id at 911. 59 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, J., concurring and dissenting). In Leonard, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and burglary. On appeal, the court held that refusal to permit defense counsel to cross-examine a Government witness concerning felony charges pending against him and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to be cautious of testimony of immunized government witnesses were reversible errors. 64 Id at 1081-82. Since Alessio's witnesses' testimony was cumulative of other witnesses' testimony, the court found that the trial was fair and that due process was not violated. If the witnesses' testimony had not been cumulative, the court seems to suggest that the witness should have been permitted to testify under a grant of immunity, unless the Government had a good reason for denying immunity. A good reason for denying immunity does not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. The lack of a good reason for denying immunity was in substance equated with prosecutorial misconduct in the Virgin Islands case.
65 United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979). In Wight, the defendant, who was accused of extortion, contended that extraordinary circumstances existed because the witness he sought to immunize ws " 'perhaps the most critical witness'" against him and his testimony was needed so that the defendant could crossexamine him, thus assuring a fair trial. Id The court found that the witness' statement "was not the only, nor even the most important" evidence and therefore refused to grant immunity to him. Id
The "extraordinary circumstances" standard is also accepted by the government. The United States Attorneys' Manual concedes that immunity for a defendant's witness should be granted "in extraordinary circumstances where the defendant plainly would be deprived of a fair trial without such testimony or other information." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-11. 230 (1980) . The defendants in Praetorius were convicted of conspiring to import, possess, and distribute heroin. On appeal, they alleged several errors including denial of immunity for the defendant's witness. the district court had refused to grant immunity because the witness' testimony related solely to the credibility of another witness. Concluding that extraordinary circumstances did not exist, the court of appeals upheld the district court because the witness' testimony related to the credibility of another witness and did not introduce any additional independent material evidence.
witness," a test which the court did not deem to be met where the testimony sought to be offered, "merely related to the credibility of another witness and, as such, was not crucial to the defense of the case." '6 7 The Second Circuit in United States v. Wnght 68 further indicated by way of dictum that the "extraordinary circumstances" test was not met where the testimony sought to be immunized "was not the only, nor even the most important evidence." '69 Although leaving open the possibility of relief in narrow circumstances, the Turkish decision continues the trend of rejection of due process claims. In Turkish, the defendant was convicted of income tax evasion, filing false income tax returns and conspiring to defraud the United States. 7 0 Several of the government's witnesses at trial were coconspirators involved in the fraudulent transactions. Three of these witnesses who had pleaded guilty received letter agreements 7 ' stating that they would not be prosecuted if they testified truthfully, as did two other un-indicted witnesses. A sixth prosecution witness was granted statutory use immunity.
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After the prosecution had completed its case, Turkish and his codefendants moved that seventeen of the prospective defense witnesses be granted statutory use immunity. 73 Turkish argued that these witnesses would provide exculpatory testimony, but would refuse to testify fearing self-incrimination. The trial judge asked the prosecution to consider granting immunity, but after consideration, the Government refused. The trial judge subsequently denied the defense motion for a new trial or acquittal, ruling that Turkish's motion was untimely and that none of the witnesses' testimony would be exculpatory.
After examining Turkish's fifth amendment due process claims, the appellate court considered two possible bases for defense witness immunity. First, the court rejected the claim of "basic fairness" 74 that would require the Government exercising the right to compel testimony to 
1980). The defendant in
Davis was convicted of conspiring to transfer and conceal a bankrupt corporation's property and of aiding and abetting the bankruptcy fraud. On appeal, he challenged the district court's refusal to order the prosecutor to immunize one of his witnesses. The court found that the defendant's right to a fair trial was not denied because the witness' testimony was introduced merely to establish the credibility of another witness' testimony. [Vol. 72 grant the right for the defendant too. The court concluded that "equalization is not a sound principle on which to extend any particular procedural device." ' 75 While Turkish dismissed the notion that parity must exist between the rights of the defense and prosecution, the court's reasoning is somewhat inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Wardius v. Oregon ,76 the Supreme Court held that due process required reciprocity of discovery rights between the defense and the prosecution even when reciprocity would result in the defense obtaining evidence to which the defendant had no independent constitutional right. the testimony of a witness whose testimony may acquit the defendant is substantive in any meaningful sense. If an effective defense requires an immunity grant to a defense witness, then the right to introduce that information in evidence is plainly substantive."' To call such a right procedural is to exalt semantics over substance.
Although Turkish rejected the "basic fairness" basis for defense witness immunity, the court took more seriously the second due process claim that by refusing to grant immunity to defense witnesses, a court blocks the admission of the defendant's exculpatory evidence. The court -rejected this contention, supporting its conclusion by noting that various privileges including those of attorney-client and doctor-patient often exclude a defendant's evidence.
8 2 This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, testimonial privileges are not absolute. Several state courts have ruled that the sixth amendment requires that a witness' claim of privilege be rejected when the witness possesses exculpatory evidence. 8 3 Second, and more fundamentally, compulsion of testimony by an attorney or by other parties to confidential communicaof procedural provisions," id, the observation is at best correct only so far as the procedure for immunizing witnesses is concerned, and not as to the question of whether witnesses should be granted immunity. Indeed, even from the standpoint of the witness, the change from transactional to use immunity is substantive since it alters the scope of fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination from overly broad protection to protection coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) . Even if the granting of immunity were deemed solely procedural from the defendant's standpoint, Goldstein, supra note 79, at 1192, suggests that "[i]f a procedural system is to be fair and just, it must give each ofthe participants to a dispute the opportunity to sustain his position. It must not create conditions which add to any essential inequality of position between the parties but rather must assure that such inequality will be minimized as much as human ingenuity can do so." Thus, even if the immunity statutes are merely viewed as procedural tools, due process requires procedural fairness as well. The Turkzh court also maintained that due process is denied only when the government withholds evidence actually in its possession. This seems an unduly narrow interpretation of Brad v. Magland, 8 5 the case which established that the government must divulge exculpatory evidence in its possession. "We now hold," the Brady Court wrote, "that the suppression by the prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
' 8 6 Relying on Brady, the Supreme Court has since found that even if a prosecutor merely negligently fails to disclose exculpatory evidence, the defendant's due process rights have been violated.
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As these decisions indicate, the right to obtain exculpatory evidence may not be denied lightly. Arguably, the arbitrary refusal by the governprosecution witness was a juvenile offender to be introduced for impeachment purposes, despite a state privilege statute. Id at 319. Westen, supra note 17, at 170-77 also argues that " [a] privilege that denies the defendant the benefit of exculpatory testimony for insufficient reasons is unconstitutional as applied." Id at 171. Westen suggests: that the doctor-patient privilege can be constitutionally narrowed, id, or modified, id at 172, the executive privilege be narrowed, id at 171, and that the lawyer-client and priest-penitent privileges be modified by permitting "disclosure for the defense while prohibiting the disclosed information from being used against the client or penitent in future civil or criminal proceedings." Id at 173. For a proposed procedure to resolve clashes between testimonial privileges and defendant's sixth amendment rights, 150, 154 (1972) . Gig'io stands for the proposition that when there is nondisclosure of material evidence whether by "negligence or design," id, the defendant's due process rights are violated. The petitioner in Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While appeal was pending, the defendant discovered new evidence which indicated that to ensure his unindicted co-conspirator's testimony, the Government had promised not to prosecute him. The co-conspirator, however, had not revealed the promise at trial under cross-examination, and the prosecutor did not correct the co-conspirator's misrepresentation because he did not know about it. Inasmuch as the disclosure may have cast doubt on the witness' credibility, the Court found that the defendant's due process rights had been violated and ordered a new trial, since all material evidence had not been disclosed. Id at 155. ment to grant immunity to a defense witness which prevents a defendant from presenting exculpatory evidence is the equivalent of suppression of evidence.
Indeed, this in substance was the alternative basis of the Virgin Islands case. There, the court suggested that the defendant's due process rights are violated "by the fact that the defendant is prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to his case." '8 8 To prevent this violation of rights, the court determined it had "inherent authority" 89 to grant immunity to defense witnesses.
The Virgin Islands court's foundation for the inherent judicial power is grounded in several Supreme Court cases. The court relied on the holding in Chambers v. Mississipi 9° that since Mississippi's evidence rules denied Chambers the right to introduce exculpatory evidence and thus deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial, the defendant was entitled to a new trial to permit him to introduce exculpatory evidence. Similarly, the Third Circuit noted that a defendant whose witnesses are not immunized cannot introduce "clearly exculpatory evidence necessary to present an effective defense." 9 '
The court also interpreted a Supreme Court decision and two other Third Circuit decisions 92 as exercises of inherent authority to grant immunity to defense witnesses. Thus the court construed the Supreme 88 615 F.2d at 969. 89 Id The Third Circuit "laid the groundwork," id at 970, for judicially created immunity in Herman v. United States, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979). In Hennan, the defendant was convicted of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO). On appeal, Herman contended that he was denied his sixth amendment right of compulsory process and that his indictment should be dismissed. Id. at 1199. The court held that Herman had no sixth amendment claim because the prosecutor had not threatened or intimidated any of Herman's witnesses, id. at 1200, and concluded that there is no "general sixth amendment right to demand that witneess... be immunized or that.. . indictments be dismissed." Id.
In addition to rejecting Herman's compulsory process argument, the court also denied his due process claim. Due process, the court found, may be required "in a case where the government relies on the testimony of witnesses who have received a grant of immunity, it [the government] may have an obligation, as a matter of fundamental fairness, to grant use immunity for defense witnesses as well." Id. at 1203. The court also rejected the due process claim because there was no prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 1204.
While rejecting both the defendant's compulsory process and due process arguments, the court said that if the issue were presented, the court might have "inherent authority to effectuate the defendant's compulsory process right by conferring a judicially fashioned immunity upon a witness whose testimony is essential to an effective defense." Id. Since the issue was not presented, the Herman court did not actually utilize its inherent power to confer defense witness immunity. Court decision in Snmons v. United States, 9 3 as creating an immunity grant by refusing to allow self-incriminatory testimony at a fourth amendment suppression hearing to be later used against the defendant. The Simmons Court reasoned that the use of this testimony would mean that a defendant could assert his fourth amendment right only by sacrificing his fifth amendment right. Declining to require this sacrifice, the Court held that since the defendant had admitted possession of contraband to assert fourth amendment rights, he was immune from prosecution by reason of this testimony. 94 While Simmons is not precisely analogous to the defense witness situation, it is similar in principle because the Court, in effect, without the prosecutor's request or approval, granted immunity to the defendant for his testimony admitting ownership at the suppression hearing. This decision is therefore a precedent for the grant of judicial immunity for a defense witness to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
IV. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN GRANTING IMMUNITY
The potential for abuse by defendants of witness immunity has concerned some courts. The Turkish court feared that the defendant and his witnesses would participate in "cooperative perjury"
95 that would acquit the defendant. A threat of a perjury conviction, the court reasoned, would not be enough to deter this conduct since perjury is difficult to prove and the penalties associated with perjury are often much less severe than are those for the substantive crime. 96 This argument does not seem persuasive because there is also a risk of perjury (though not "cooperative perjury") by immunized prosecution witnesses who hope to 93 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
94 Id. at 394.
"Cooperative perjury" is defined as when "[c]
o-defendants could secure use immunity for each other, and each immunized witness could exonerate his co-defendant at a separate trial by falsely accepting sole responsibility for the crime, secure in the knowledge that his admission could not be used at his own trial for the substantive offense." United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 101 S. Ct. 856 (1981) . A court should be resourceful enough, however, to minimize this problem by using its discretion to decline immunity for testimony of a witness inconsistent with that given at an earlier trial by the defendant. Establishment of such a rule would reduce the incentive for witness A to perjure himself at the trial of defendant B since witness A would know that at his own subsequent trial, he could not obtain the benefit of "cooperative perjury" from defendant B.
96 Id. If an immunized witness gives false testimony under oath, he will be subject to prosecution for perjury. "Under 18 U.S.C. 6002, testimony or information cannot be used, directly or indirectly, in a prosecution of a person who provides it, except a prosecution for perjury .. " U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § .that since the immunity is contingent on truthful testimony, perjured testimony did not benefit from the immunity at all and was thereby available for use at a criminal trial" (footnote omitted). escape prosecution. Other courts are concerned with co-defendants or other defense witnesses benefitting from immunity baths 97 as a result of immunity grants to a defendant's witnesses. 98 Once granted immunity, a witness might take the stand and answer questions broadly to attempt to prevent the prosecutor from relying on matters covered by his testimony in a subsequent prosecution against him. This risk also applies, however, when immunity is given to prosecution witnesses.
A corollary of the possibility of immunity bath abuse is the danger that the prosecution will be reluctant to engage in rigorous cross-examination, fearing that the witness will disclose too much and thereby preclude a future prosecution. Without effective cross-examination, the prosecutor cannot fully explore the witness' credibility or impeach his testimony. While this fear may have some basis, it is appropriate to observe that a witness will have an opportunity to take an immunity bath on direct examination. Further, the fear that a witness will disclose too much has not deterred prosecutors from granting immunity to their own witnesses.
Recognizing the harm that may result by immunizing a witness, the United States Attorneys' Manual condemns defense witness immunity. The Manual states that "a requirement that the government seek to compel the testimony of defense witnesses would place the government in an intolerable situation" because the government "would be inundated with such requests." 99 While immunization requests may delay a trial, strict judicial or statutory guidelines may reduce the number of requests and therefore the number of trial delays.1 0 0 More fundamentally, a due process right clearly takes precedence over an administrative burden or procedural inconvenience.
An additional problem raised by the Manual is that "the govern- sausive because the primary public interest argument, of special concern to the prosecutor, is that the witness is a potential defendant, a fact which is known to the prosecutor without hearing the witness' testimony. To the extent the "public interest" determination involves a determination of the exculpatory nature of the witness' testimony necessary to the furtherance of the truth-seeking process so as not to convict innocent defendants, the public interest can be weighed by the judge. It is true that the Manual recommends that when the prosecutor "realizes that a potential defense witness will exercise his privilege against self-incrimination, he [the prosecutor] has discretion as to whether he should proceed with the case in view of his estimate of the truthfulness, materiality, and exculpatory nature of the potential testimony."' 0 2 While it would clearly be appropriate for a prosecutor to make this determination in the case of his own witness, he has an obvious bias in the case of defense witnesses and the determination as to such witnesses should more appropriately be left in the hands of the judge.
A judge can obtain the information requisite to such a determination while protecting the interests of both the prosecution and defense by conducting an in camera hearing at which the potential witness, his lawyer, and a court reporter would be present. While the defense lawyer would not be present, the interest of the defense could be protected by the defense lawyer supplying the judge with a list of questions to pose to the proposed witness. The answers to these questions would then be sealed to prevent the prosecution from obtaining them. After the witness and his lawyer withdraw from the hearing, the prosecutor would then be permitted to enter the hearing to attempt to demonstrate why immunity should not be granted. After evaluating the prosecutor's arguments the judge would determine whether the witness' testimony was exculpatory and whether the prosecutor had demonstrated that the public interest would not be served by granting immunity.I 103 See Note, The Public Has a Claim to EveA Man's Evidence,supra note 17, at 1238-41. When the prosecutor denies a request for defense witness immunity, the author suggests that such immunity may be obtained by requesting an "in camera hearing in which the court can measure the proferred evidence against the materiality threshold." Id. at 1238. Other authors have also suggested the use of in camera hearings in the defense witness immunity situation. For example, in Note, Separation of Powers andDefense Witness Immunity, 66 GEo. LJ. 51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Separation of Powers], the author suggests that there be an ex parte, in camera proceeding before the trial to determine if the defendant's potential witness will present material evidence. Id. at 80. Since the witness' fifth amendment rights are jeopardized when the prosecutor is aware of information from the witness' own mouth, a neutral Another reason prosecutors are reluctant to ask for witness immunity is that the government must sustain a "heavy burden"' 1 0 4 to prove that the evidence later used to prosecute the witness 0 5 was not obtained as a result of the immunized testimony. 0 6 The government rarely succeeds in proving independent derivation because of this burden, and thus prefers to grant immunity sparingly. Commentators and judges have suggested several means to remedy prosecutorial reluctance to grant use immunity. The prosecutor could preserve the independence of party, such as a judge, must conduct the in camera hearing. However, a judge at a pre-trial hearing might encounter difficulty in determining whether the proposed testimony is exculpatory and not merely cumulative. Thus, perhaps the better time to conduct such a hearing would be after the defense is presented so the judge could determine if the evidence, in light of the testimony already introduced, is exculpatory. This suggestion may create difficulties, however, because of the interruption of trials. If the witness should invoke his fifth amendment privilege at the in camera hearing, the judge should grant the witness immunity for the limited purpose of that hearing. Since the testimony will be sealed, the prosecutor will not have a chance to use it against the witness. In addition to the suggestion of an in camera hearing, the author in Note, A New UseforlKastigar, supra note 16, proposes other solutions to effectuate defense witness immunity: judicial review of the good faith of the prosecutor's decision, and the prosecutor granting immunity or facing a "missing witness" instruction or dropping the case. Id. at 88-96.
Judge Lumbard's dissent in Turkish regarding the propriety of in camera hearings envisions such a proceeding as a bureaucratic disaster because in addition to the judge determining whether the prosecutor properly refused to grant immunity, the judge will also have to determine whether the fifth amendment claims were made in good faith. 623 F.2d 780. Whenever a witness invokes the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, however, the judge does not know whether it was done in good faith. The purpose behind an in camera hearing is to determine whether the witness possesses exculpatory evidence, while preventing the prosecutor from hearing the witness' potentially incriminating evidence.
The in camera hearing also largely protects against another of Judge Lumbard's fears. Lumbard worries about "unnecessary disclosure of information by the prosecution" which "increases the difficulties of administering criminal justice." Id. However, since the defense attorney would not be present during the presentation of evidence to the judge by the prosecutor, in the in camera hearing, no unnecessary disclosure of evidence would take place except to court reporters and other administrative aides.
104 623 F.2d at 775. 105 Granting use immunity permits the government to prosecute the witness, if the evidence was derived independently of the immunized testimony. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972) . Kastigar challenged the constitutionality of the use immunity statutes, arguing that use immunity was not coextensive with the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination. The Supreme Court found that "immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege," id., and that transactional immunity was broader than the scope of the self-incrimination privilege. The Court concluded that use immunity sufficiently protected a witness from other possible uses of the compelled testimony because "'the federal authorities have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence.'" Id. at 460. 106 At least one commentator has noted the difficulty of proving that evidence is independently derived. Rejecting this method, the Turkish court found this possibility inadequate when a continuing investigation disclosed "vital evidence after though not resulting from, the immunized testimony."' 0 8 The United States Attorneys' Manual directly addresses this concern, providing that if a witness is granted immunity, but future prosecution may be warranted, the United States attorney should "maintain a record of the nature, source, and date of receipt of evidence concerning the witness's past criminal conduct that becomes available after he has testified or provided other information.
... 09 Another response to the concern about impairing future prosecutions, suggested by the Virgin Islands court, is to delay the case to permit the prosecution to gather more evidence on the potential witness. In a case in which a person is to testify or provide other information pursuant to a compulsion order: (a) if it then appears that the public interest may warrant a future prosecution of the witness, on the basis of independent evidence, for his past criminal conduct about which he is to be questioned, the attorney for the government shall:
(1) before the witness has testified or provided other information, prepare for the case file a signed and dated memorandum summarizing the evidence then known to exist concerning the witness, and designating its sources and date of receipt; (2) ensure that all testimony given, or information provided, by the witness be recorded verbatim and that the recording or reporter's notes, together with any transcript thereof, be maintained in a secure location and that access thereto be documented; and (3) maintain a record of the nature, source, and date of receipt of evidence concerning the witness's past criminal conduct that becomes available after he has testified or provided other information .... 108 623 F.2d at 775. 109 U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 65, § 1-11.330(b). In this situation, the Manual also provides that the United States attorney should "ensure that all testimony, or information provided by the witness be recorded verbatim. . . ." Id. The method suggested by the Manual also provides an answer to Judge Lumbard's criticism in his dissent to Turkish where he wrote that defense witness immunity would subject the prosecutor to a heavy burden to maintain "separate staffs to ensure compliance with a restriction that no use may be made of what the witness might say." 623 F.2d at 779. By keeping a careful log of information uncovered by the prosecution, as the Manual suggests, the need to maintain separate staffs would be alleviated.
110 615 F.2d at 973. 111 The sixth amendment guarantees "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. permissible to allow the prosecution to finish its investigation without sacrificing the defendant's right to a speedy trial." e 2 Further, it would not be unreasonable to require a defendant who wishes to obtain immunity for a witness to waive his right to contest trial delays reasonably necessary to avoide prejudice to the government by reason of the request for immunity.
V.
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENT
While citing the aforementioned policy reasons for rejecting defense witness immunity, courts have emphasized that the major obstacle to defense witness immunity is the disruption of the separation of powers balance between the judicial and executive branches of government.'
13
As the court in Turkish wrote,
[h]ow these substantial concerns are to be weighed against the defendant's interest in securing truthful exculpatory testimony through defense witness immunity turns in large part upon whether the balancing of these interests is appropriately a judicial function. The Government suggests it is not, contending that the granting of immunity is pre-eminently a function of the Executive Branch.14 It could be argued with equal plausibility that a determination whether defense testimony is exculpatory and should be submitted to the jury is (8)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends ofjustice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. (1974) . Nixon established that the President's claim of executive privilege in refiising to honor a subpoena duces tecum for "certain tapes, memoranda, papers, transcripts or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the President and others," id at 688, which was rooted in the separation of powers doctrine, was outweighed by the need for "specific evidence" in a pending criminal trial. Examples of this supervisory control include judicial intervention when the prosecutor, in his closing statement, introduces facts that have not been admitted in evidence during the trial, 12 1 when the prosecutor breaks an agreement with the defendant, 122 and when the prosecutor fails to call perjured testimony to the attention of the court. 23 Although a refusal to grant defense witness immunity might not rise to the level of unethical or improper behavior, the court must supervise the prosecutor to protect important constitutional rights of due process and compulsory process. One commentator states that
[w]hen an individual defendant's constitutional rights are concerned, courts have shown an even greater inclination to review discretionary acts. If such acts deprive defendants of their rights, courts have felt free to require the prosecutor to take steps to insure that those rights are protected.
It seems logical that courts should take the same approach when faced with a prosecutor's refusal to grant immunity.1
24
Further support for the judicial power to review prosecutorial discretion in refusing to grant use immunity to a defendant's witnesses lies in the history of immunity. The congressional grant of authority to the prosecutor rests on an historical basis. 125 Immunity to compel a witness to testify despite his fear of self-incrimination was originally conferred in England by executive pardon. In Queen v. Boes, 126 a witness refused to testify that he received a bribe from the defendant. To compel the witness to speak, "the counsel for the Crown handed a pardon under the Great Seal to the witness."' 127 The court held that the pardon protected the witness from all further connected legal proceedings and compelled the witness to testify.
Relying on the English precedent, the Supreme Court required the early immunity statutes in the United States to be transactional and hence very broad. Transactional immunity, like a pardon, precludes prosecution of protected witnesses for any crime arising out of the same transaction, event, or occurrence. 1 28 Thus, once transactional immunity was granted, the witness could not be prosecuted. 136 found that transactional immunity conferred broader protection than the self-incrimination privilege required. In contrast to transactional immunity statutes which rendered the witness immune from prosecution, the use immunity statutes, which "prohibit the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect,"' 137 do not preclude further prosecution of the witness based upon independent evidence. 1 38 Use immunity thus departed from the historical concept of an executive pardon and instead adopted this narrower standard for immunity. Under a grant of use immunity, the witness is in no better or worse position than if he had not been called to testify.
Since the original concept of immunity was an executive pardon, the courts traditionally did not decide whether to grant immunity, for the Constitution dictates that the pardoning power is absolute and entirely an executive function. 139 With the creation of use immunity, however, the executive branch can no longer argue that in granting immunity, the judiciary usurps an executive function since use immunity still permits the later prosecution of the witness. There would therefore appear to be little if any basis for the separation of powers argument in the case of use immunity.
VI. A JUDICIALLY CREATED ALTERNATIVE
In the Virgin Islands case, the court held that if, on remand, the district court found that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred at the original trial, the defendant would be acquitted unless the prosecutor granted immunity at a new trial.t4 This is a harsh remedy which leaves the prosecution with no choice when prosecuting the defendant. Recognizing that such action might not be justified when there was no prosecutorial misconduct and recognizing the possible presence of a "strong countervailing systemic interest" 14 1 the court outlined a less drastic procedure for accommodating the rights of prosecution and defense. The court's guidelines, designed to protect against judicial abuse of the immunity power, are: (1) immunity must be properly sought in the district court; (2) the defense witness must be available to testify; (3) the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; and (4) no strong McMichael, the trial judge was asked to immunize a defense witness who would testify that' the defendant had "lack of knowledge," id at 206, of the contents of a box shipped from Ecuador. Id at 207. The judge refused to grant immunity to the witness, and in dicta, criticized and rejected the decision in Government of Virgin Islands . Smith. Finding that Virgin Island's facts were unusual and were "a perfect example of a case in which hard facts make • . .bad law," id at 206, the judge concluded that judicially created witness immunity does not exist, "with the exception of an enunciation of a judicial power to order that statutory immunity be granted with dismissal to follow if the grant does not issue." Id at 210.
In contrast to McMichael, and without finding prosecutorial misconduct, the court in United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980), accepted and applied the Virgin Islands tests. The Lowell court found that judicially conferred witness immunity could not be granted because the proposed witness' testimony was not exculpatory, id at 905, and that immunity was properly denied because the witness was a potential target of prosecution. Id cutor's province, the provision permits a judge to grant immunity to a defendant's witnesses upon a determination that such a grant will serve the public interest. The "public interest" should be determined by balancing the degree to which the immunity grant will enhance the fact finding process against the need to prosecute the witness. 15 1 While the guidelines should enable the courts to dispose of most cases in a consistent manner, the proposal does leave room for conflicting decisions in a case where the potential witness is a target but his testimony is clearly exculpatory and noncumulative. The determination of public interest is intended to reflect the case law which recognizes that minimizing the effect of an immunity grant on the prosecutor's continuing investigations and possible future indictments is important. The overall effect of the statute is to balance a defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights with the need for apprehending and convicting criminals. With this statutory change, immunity will be sparingly granted, thus allaying the fears of those who oppose granting immunity to defense witnesses.
CONCLUSION
Defense witness immunity is an issue that raises both fifth and sixth amendment problems. Some courts recognize the need for compelling immunity when there is prosecutorial misconduct. One court has indicated that immunity should be granted based upon a general due process right to produce exculpatory evidence. Courts argue that judicial intervention on behalf of defendants may violate the separation of powers required by the Constitution, but this at best conceptual argument is unsound because the use immunity statutes alter the traditional concept of the granting of a pardon under the transactional immunity statutes. While use immunity does not preclude future prosecution of a witness, and while the policy objections to grants of immunity to defense witnesses are not persuasive, courts are reluctant to accept judicially created defense witness immunity even with proper safeguards. The inadequacies in these judicial remedies dictate that legislatures amend use immunity statutes. This change would retain immunity as a prosecutorial power, but would also confer power on the courts to grant immunity to defense witnesses if the statutory tests which emphasize .public interest considerations are fulfilled. This statutory change will enable courts to balance effectively important societal interests with fundamental contitutional rights.
ELLEN SHERIFF
151 Id [Vol. 72 
